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cess.1 Most of the new philosophies proposed in this period, from Marsilio Ficino's revival
of Platonism in the fifteenth century to Robert Boyle's experimental natural philosophy in the mid seventeenth, were billed as more pious or Christian than the dominant Aristotelian philosophy, and their authors used this argument to help justify the move to replace Aristotelianism. Even Rene Descartes, in devising his new philosophy, felt that he was fulfilling a mission assigned him by Cardinal Berulle, one of the leading figures of the French Counter-Reformation. In the renewed quest for a pious natural philosophy in the late Renaissance, many championed other ancient philosophies, like Epicureanism (Pierre Gassendi) or Stoicism (Justus Lipsius) or varieties of neo-Platonism (Marsilio Ficino, Bernardino Telesio, Francesco Patrizi). But resorting to other pagan philosophers posed in a new way the same problem as had Aristotelianism: these authorities too had to be Christianized.2 Hence the appeal of another, potentially more radical solution, which I examine here: using the Bible as a source of natural philosophical knowledge to supplement or in some cases to replace Aristotle. In this essay I focus on a particular subgroup of the many who searched for a pious or Christian philosophy in the late Renaissance: those who proposed a solution based on a literal reading of the Bible and whose particular emphasis on Genesis earned them the appellation of "sacred" or "Mosaic" philosophers.
No doubt almost all philosophers in early modem Europe wanted their philosophy to concord with religion and could be called "pious" in this weak sense. The majority of philosophers felt that they were best serving the interests of their religion by remaining faithful to Aristotelianism, for which the work of Christianizing had already been performed, notably by a variety of scholastic philosophies. Thus for a professor at the University of Paris in the first half of the seventeenth century-in a complete reversal of the situation in 1277-to criticize Aristotle (as, for example, Gassendi and the chemical philosophers did) was to be impious. To support Aristotle as the philosophical pillar of the Thomist synthesis, on the other hand, was to choose a philosophy that was guaranteed to accord with religion. The Church also called on Aristotelian philosophers to make their science better serve religion. In particular, the Fifth Lateran Council (1512-1517) mandated that philosophers develop demonstrations of the religious doctrine of the immortality of the soul. Only a very few philosophers, like Pietro Pomponazzi at Padua, responded by one's philosophy was so great that "there is at least a bit of 'Mosaic philosophy' in almost every thinker of the time," including Descartes. 6 The Mosaic philosophers I will consider here took this tendency to its logical extreme and advocated a philosophy drawn primarily from biblical authority, although they too did not always practice what they preached and in the end also relied on Aristotelian categories. In their call to reject received (Aristotelian and human) authority, their strategy can sound quite modern at times. They appealed to a single, universal truth that transcended religious divides, and they pursued an irenic ideal at the height of the European wars of religion (ca. 1570-1630). In response to the traumatic splintering of Christianity and the growing dissatisfaction with the inadequacies of Aristotle and other ancient authorities, they harbored and fostered high hopes of resolving philosophical and religious diversity by grounding philosophy in the most indisputable authority-that of the Bible. But in their search for a pious philosophy, these authors were genuinely concerned to keep both philosophy (against those who would eliminate it from the studies of the godly, a move afoot among some strict Lutherans in the late sixteenth century) and piety (against those enamored with Aristotelian naturalism). They articulated most explicitly and cogently the concern central to the centuries-old and still ongoing efforts to devise a philosophy fundamentally compatible with piety and in so doing forged a path distinct from both the traditionalists and those who in the end prevailed as the "modems."
COMENIUS AS AN EXPONENT OF MOSAIC PHILOSOPHY
Although modern historians of science have mostly neglected or hastily dismissed this strand of early modern philosophy, the first historians of philosophy active in the eighteenth century, like Johann Jakob Brucker, in describing philosophical developments since the Renaissance, reserved a category for "Mosaic and Christian philosophers" alongside other, more familiar categories including Aristotelians, Platonists, Epicureans, Stoics, Skeptics, Theosophs, and Syncretists.7 Brucker describes how some philosophers, in avoiding the Scylla of skepticism, foundered on the Charybdis of seeking in the Bible the foundations of natural and moral science. In his negative assessment of this strategy Brucker distinguishes between two different ways of misusing the Bible: Brucker devotes a chapter to each, separating those who advocated a literalist use of the Bible (among whom he includes Francisco Valles, Otto Casmann, Johann Heinrich Alsted, Conrad Aslacus, Lambert Daneau, and Johann Amos Comenius) from those like Paracelsus, Jakob Boehme, Robert Fludd, and their followers, who also proclaimed their philosophies to be uniquely Christian because grounded in divine revelation but who read the Bible through layers of allegory and personal inspiration foreign to the properly "Mosaic and Christian philosophers."8
To be sure, one could conjoin these two kinds of philosophers under the same category, as Daniel Georg Morhof did in his chapter on "Mosaic physics" in the Polyhistor (in a section published posthumously in 1708 from Morhof's notes). Following his "invective" against the "inept piety, or rather superstition," of those who believe that the principles of all sciences are hidden in sacred Scripture, Morhof includes in this chapter those who tried to reconcile the account of Moses with Platonic, Cartesian, and Aristotelian principles, among them Henry More the Platonist, Johannes Amerpoel the Cartesian, Robert Fludd, who "was mixed up," and Daneau, Aslacus, and Alsted, whom he considers excessively beholden to Aristotelianism. But Morhof also mentions alchemical authors like Jean d'Espagnet, "cabbalists" like Francesco Giorgi, "enthusiasts" like Jakob Boehme and Quirinus Kiihlmann, and Rosicrucians like Aegidius Guthmann and John Heydon. Morhof gives the most consideration to Comenius and his follower Johan Bayer, as the only ones to have built a new system of physics methodically on Mosaic foundations.9 Further research into other early histories of philosophy could better illuminate the shifting boundaries of the flexible category of "Mosaic philosophy." But modem commentators have 8 
tended to follow Brucker's distinction, separating (as I will too) the "genuine" Mosaic philosophers from those who made little pretense at a literal reading of the Bible.10
When one considers the categories used by the authors themselves involved in the development of Mosaic or rival philosophies some fifty to one hundred years before Brucker and Morhof, Brucker's narrower definition of Mosaic philosophers as biblical literalists indeed seems the dominant one. Thus one contemporary, in surveying the different kinds of natural philosophy of his day, named as "Mosaic" natural philosophers Daneau, Casmann, and Aslacus. Similarly, Johann Heinrich Alsted offered from within the camp of Christian philosophers a "biblical encyclopedia" of sacred philosophy, law, and medicine drawn from the Old and New Testaments. Alsted lists as his "most Christian" predecessors in various fields authors included among Brucker's literalists: in particular, for sacred physics, Valles, Daneau, and Aslacus, to whom he adds Levinus Lemnius. Casmann is featured for his sacred ethics and economics; Conrad Heresbach for a compendium of law; and one Grossius for a compendium of medicine derived from Scripture.ll For Alsted, as for Brucker, Mosaic philosophy embraced a full range of disciplines, from natural philosophy (or physics) to ethics, law, and politics.
Probably the most articulate and most widely read of the "Mosaic" or " that are and are made, to sense, reason and Scripture, with so much evidence and certainty ... that any mortal man seeing may see, and feeling may feel, the truth scattered every where.15
In calling for the correction of received Aristotelian philosophy Comenius envisions a physics based on the conjoined evidence of "sense, reason and Scripture," as if their agreement would be unproblematic.
Comenius calls for a balance between extremes of rationalism and biblicism. To trust sense or reason alone would lead to predictable errors and abstractions. But, similarly, the Bible alone is not a sufficient guide:
They that heed the Scripture onely and hearken neither to sense nor reason are either carried away beyond the world (by the sublimity of their conceptions) or else involve things they understand not with the Colliers [unquestioning, blind] faith; or following the letter, propound unto themselves things, though never so absurd and superstitious, to be believed; as the papists do in that most absurd transubstantiation of theirs, etc. So then the principles of knowing must be conjoyned, that divine revelation may afford us belief; Reason, Understanding; Sense, certainty. And they must be used in this order (in naturall things I say) as that we begin with sense, and end in Revelation (as it were the setting to the seal of God:) for by this order every subsequent degree will receive from the antecedent, both Evidence and also Certainty and Emendation.
In Comenius's program reason is ultimately subordinate, however. Just as raw sense experience is corrected by reason (for example, in the case of optical illusions), so too reason is subject to correction by faith. This correction is "not violent ... but gentle, so that that very thing which is corrected, acknowledgeth, and admits it of its own accord, and with joy. Not that I would crosse the design of great Verulam (who thought it the best way to abstein from Axiomes and method, till full inductions could be made, of all and every thing throughout all nature:) but to make an experiment in the mean time, whether more light might be let into our minds by this means to observe the secrets of nature the more easily, that so praise might be perfected to God out of the very mouth of infants, and confusion prepared for the gainsaying enemies; as David having comprised the summe of Physicks in a short hymne for the use of the unlearned speaks (Psalm 8). I have entituled it a Synopsis of Physicks reformed by divine light. 
In Comenius's view, drawing natural philosophical statements out of the Bible promises more rapid progress toward the twin goals of the discipline-certain causal knowledge and the praise of God-and a quicker refutation of Peripatetic enemies. Given his millenarian convictions, Comenius was particularly concerned with attaining results as quickly as possible.17 But in grounding this "Christian philosophy" on biblical authority Comenius clearly parts company with Bacon. For Comenius, "Philosophy is lame without divine

tion." Bacon, by contrast, warns against "mixtures of theology with philosophy" and rejects precisely this kind of biblical philosophy when he complains:
Yet in this vanity some of the modems have with extreme levity indulged so far as to attempt to found a system of natural philosophy on the first chapter of Genesis, on the book of Job, and other parts of the sacred writings, seeking for the dead among the living; which also makes the inhibition and repression of it the more important, because from this unwholesome mixture of things human and divine there arises not only a fantastic philosophy but also a heretical religion. Very meet it is therefore that we be sober-minded, and give to faith that only which is faith's.
Although Bacon does not specify whom he meant to target in this passage, he clearly identifies the project of Mosaic philosophy as a contemporary phenomenon and as a real threat to the proper demarcation of philosophy and religion.l8
COMENIUS'S "MOST CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHERS"
Comenius provides us with names where Bacon did not; he reserves unadulterated praise for an interesting list of predecessors in his project of a "Christian philosophy":
Those most Christian Philosophers are therefore deservedly to be praised, who have endeavored to render unto God the Parent of things that praise that is due unto him: Franc. Valesius, Lambert Danaeus, Levinus Lemnius, Thomas Lydiat, Conradus Aslacus, Otto Casmannus; who have not doubted to asseverate that the seeds of true Philosophy are conteined in the holy Book of the Bible, and to derive their maximes of Philosophy from thence (though with different successe). The two treatises argue for two hypotheses "against the opinion of many Christians now excessively addicted to gentile, especially Peripatetic philosophers": first, "that there is an enormous mass of supercelestial waters, cause of the first motion etc.," and, second, "a great abundance of fire below the earth, cause of eternal springs, etc."26 In his arguments against Aristotelian explanations in meteorology and cosmology (from fiery or watery exhalations or the nature of a fifth, heavenly element, which Lydiat rejects), Lydiat adduces philosophical authorities and reasoning but in concluding emphasizes the authority of the Bible. Notably, in his final chapter Lydiat cites the Bible abundantly to support his conclusions, and Comenius seizes on his closing passage to claim as an ally an author who probably more than the others on the list held status among contemporary practitioners of natural philosophy (as quoted below, p. 51).
This list overlaps to a large extent with the "most Christian men" hailed by Alsted in his Triumphus bibliorum (1625) and with the "Mosaic and Christian philosophers" named in Brucker (though Lydiat is unique to Comenius's list).19 All such lists are admittedly artificial constructs, which may well have served as sources one for the next, and they lend a posthumous aura of coherence to a group of authors active independently of one another across Europe, from Spain to Denmark, between 1566 and 1613. Nonetheless, these constructions of a category have some basis in
Comenius saici." Or, more pragmatically, perhaps none of them was orthodox enough to enhance the standing of Christian philosophy among a broader, mainstream audience, which was no doubt part of Comenius's purpose in this work. Comenius certainly adopted a number of Paracelsian, alchemical, and hermetic ideas in his natural philosophy. He identifies the three chemical principles and emphasizes a triad of principles of his own: matter as the principle of being, spirit the principle of life, and light the principle of motion. Comenius also supports atomism from biblical references to primordial dust in Genesis and Job. But, as Jaromir Cervenka points out, Comenius cites primarily Juan Luis Vives, Tommaso Campanella, and Francis Bacon rather than more controversial Paracelsian or atomist sources.28 In outlining the specifics of his physics, Comenius draws on a variety of different philosophical systems available at the time, including Aristotelianism, which he does not completely abandon. The originality of his "Christian physics" is more evident in the lengthy theoretical preface about his project than in the particular combination of existing explanatory elements that he offers in the body of the text. Indeed, in looking at what Comenius's "Christian philosophers" have in common, it is easier to identify "Christian philosophy" as a set of shared theoretical tenets than as a uniform system of natural philosophical explanation.
THE TENETS OF "PIOUS PHILOSOPHY"
The Unity of Knowledge
Above all, Comenius's "most Christian philosophers" have in common a desire to construct a new natural philosophy, freed from a slavish adherence to the authority of Aristotle, Plato, and every other philosopher (including Petrus Ramus or Jacopo Zabarella, as Casmann adds pointedly), and beholden instead to truth, which is found through reason but especially in the sacred authority of Scripture. Lydiat explicitly repeats the refrain, common in various forms to many Renaissance thinkers: "amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, sed maxime amica veritas" (Socrates is a friend, Plato is a friend, but truth is the greatest friend).29 Across their different backgrounds (Catholic, Lutheran, and a preponderance of Calvinists), these authors proposed a firm rejoinder to the doubts of both philosophers and theologians, in the wake of unsettling innovations in the two fields, as to the very possibility of a harmonious synthesis between philosophy and theology. If the concept of a "double truth" was rarely advanced explicitly by any philosopher, it was nonetheless perceived as the dangerous presupposition of extremists on both sides: of philosophers like Pomponazzi, on the one hand, who seemed to deny the immortality of the soul, and of theologians in the strict descendance of Luther, on the other hand. In the latter vein, Daniel Hofmann, a professor of theology at the University of Helmstedt in the 1580s and 1590s, sought to stop the teaching of philosophy altogether on the grounds that philosophical conclusions contradicted theological ones. Against these two kinds of enemies, the pious philosophers emphasized the unity of philosophical and religious truth, which guaranteed both a role for philosophy and a generally increased role for the Bible.
As their largely self-assigned title indicates, the "Christian philosophers" were committed to the alliance between piety and philosophy and the rejection of any notion of double truth. For Casmann, "the double truth of one and the same thing, one theological, of divine wisdom, the other philosophical, of human wisdom, is a devilish figment very convenient to excuse and defend all errors and atheisms. The truth is one and simple, and always similar to itself: but the false is multiple and always dissimilar to itself." Lydiat rejected the separation of theological and physical truth as "what is commonly done."30 The strategies that Comenius's "Christian philosophers" proposed for unifying knowledge differed, as I will later discuss in more detail-"Christian philosophy" was often more effective as an agenda than as a practice. The principal strategies were to offer a natural philosophical commentary on the Bible or to draw new principles of physics from the the 1580s and 1590s, then, Daniel Hofmann (1538-1621) was rebelling against established pedagogical practices when he renewed Luther's original call to eliminate philosophy from the curriculum. After teaching philosophy himself at the newly founded University of Helmstedt from 1576 to 1578, Hofmann became professor of theology there. He grew increasingly hostile toward the philosophers at Helmstedt, who were mostly humanist and Philippist in orientation. In particular, Hofmann combatively maintained that even the best use of philosophy was contrary to theology. Despite rallying a few supporters at Helmstedt, the "Hofmannian controversy" he generated ended with his dismissal from the university after a public apology to the philosophers in 1601. His attempts at modifying the curriculum had failed. But Hofmann inspired a few former students to pursue his line of argumentation in the 1620s in Magdeburg, among them Johann Angelius Werdenhagen, Wenceslaus Schilling, and Andreas Cramer, who spearheaded the "Controversia crameriana magdeburgensis." Although the antiphilosophical stance championed by Hofmann and his followers was never implemented, it embodied a continued threat that seemed serious to contemporaries and early modem historians. Brucker, for example, closes his survey of seventeenth-century thinkers with a chapter on the "enemies of philosophy" that is devoted primarily to the "Hofmann controversy."33 The theological opposition to philosophy never spread beyond a narrow group of extreme Lutherans, but in the German area it kept alive the threat of a return to Luther's own original position.
Bible. But whatever strategy one took, the ideal of showing the unity of philosophy and theology was a long-traditional agenda with medieval origins, reinvigorated at the Fifth Lateran Council by the call to philosophers to demonstrate religious truths; it acquired a new urgency in the context of the late Renaissance during the decades of religious wars and increasing confessionalism. In this setting of intense disarray, the pious philosophers thought they could provide, by relying on "sense, reason and Scripture," a single, indubitable truth for everyone everywhere, to unite all confessions and philosophical schools.
The Role of Philosophy
Although their recourse to the Bible as the only certain and most ancient authority may seem to us deeply unphilosophical, the Christian philosophers were committed to both parts of their label, to the possibility of uniting piety with philosophical learning. Thus Casmann warns of two dangers: on the one hand, he fears the threat posed by those who because of the few things which they see with their eagle eyes differ in the books of the pagan philosophers from the decrees and sanctity of our religion, reject not only all the other very numerous true and useful things transmitted by [those philosophers], but also slander and calumny the Christian knowledge of any philosophy and call for it to be eliminated from the society of men, especially of Christians, like a plague.... [On the other hand] the second threat is of those who admire and embrace the divine talents, as they call them, of Plato and Aristotle, ... so that these worshippers of men (anthropolaters and prosopolaters) embrace them with such assent of mind, as if they were divinities and gods free from the errors of philosophy, that they can hardly believe that something might be proven which they had disproved or
The fear of a theology hostile to philosophy was also alive elsewhere, even outside the Lutheran context. Thus Robert Boyle can be found implying that dangerously antiphilosophical clerics exist and that their impact is to be deplored. As in the case of "atheists," who were regularly reviled in the sixteenth century even though hardly any were clearly identified, one can conclude that the specter of a much-feared enemy (here, theologians who would reject philosophy) galvanized a preventive defensive strategy. The Christian (cit. n. 7), Vol. 4, Pt. 1 bk. 3, ch. 5, "De hostibus philosophiae," pp. 776-785. philosophers felt that the best way to defend philosophy against these theological attacks was to make it more pious. Thus Casmann called for the liberation of philosophy from its excessive indebtedness to ancient (or, more rarely, modem) authority. Lydiat too warned of a "peripatetic theology" that Christians were embracing as if it were a religious doctrine.34 The point of mocking slavish Aristotelians was not to do away with philosophy altogether but, rather, to save it, notably from the attacks of theologians, by making it thoroughly pious and true.
The Role of the Bible
Finally, the pious philosophers agreed on reading the Bible for its statements about nature.
Valles explains this position against detractors:
I am persuaded that these Scriptures were written by human friends of God inspired by the Holy Spirit, and very little for the interpretation of nature.... Nonetheless since some natural questions are woven into the line of discussion, I believe that they are all very true, since they are dictated by the spirit of God, the absolute embodiment of truth, and flow from the author of nature himself, for whom nothing can be hidden.... For these reasons I persuade myself and want all to be persuaded that there is a whole other doctrine, which is true, contained in these divine books-that is a natural one.35
Valles turns the argument that the Bible's purpose is religious rather than philosophical on its head: since God had no need to introduce natural questions in the Bible, when he does so these statements should be taken seriously. As a result, Valles concludes that the Bible contains truths of natural philosophy as well as other disciplines.
In started with the principle that the Mosaic account is historical and should be read as such.36 Comenius's "Christian philosophers" commonly complained that the meaning of the Bible had been distorted (literally, "tortured") to fit the opinions of pagan philosophers, especially the Peripatetics. Thus Lydiat complained of the many contemporaries who denied the existence of supercelestial waters: "[by] twisting the words of holy Scripture to the meaning of the pagan philosophers, especially the Peripatetics, they decide that these waters pour forth from what is commonly called the middle region of the air in which clouds form." Casmann gave a resounding negative to the question of whether "on physical matters the sacred oracles should be tortured to fit the common rules of Aristotelian physics." Aslakss0n, too, found nothing more absurd than applying an exclusively allegorical interpretation to the first three chapters of Moses, which should instead be read literally in the first instance.37
As the word of God, the Bible was inevitably the most sacred and highest authority. These philosophers also highlighted its great antiquity and its encyclopedic store of truth. For Comenius, the divine writings are "like an universal treasury of wisdome." Lydiat, concluding his Disquisitio physiologica with a chapter on the Flood, hails the Bible as a neglected source of information in a passage that Comenius quotes enthusiastically: "And piously T. Lydiat: 'It is most absurd, that heathen Philosophers should seek for the principles of all arts in one Homers poesie, and that we Christians should not do the same in the Oracles of God, which are a most plentifull and most clear fountain of wisdome.' " Similarly, Aslakss0n calls on Christians to read and meditate on the unique and inexhaustible treasury of the sacred writings of the prophets and apostles, with even more diligence than the pagan philosophers studied their philosophical authorities. And Lemnius praises the Bible as a source of "plentiful knowledge and copious learning" and of more "sovereign food for both soul and conscience" than is to be had from the books of philosophers or orators and poets. Lemnius, down to 1667) . Without attempting a full study of the reception of these works, one can begin to assess their impact from the texts themselves. The texts are generally forceful in presenting the principles of a "pious" or "Christian" philosophy, but less so in putting that agenda into practice. One often gets the sense that the Christian philosophers found their principles more worthy of attention than the specific conclusions they might generate. In Casmann and Comenius, the principles dominate; similarly, only the first of Daneau's two books, on the principles of Christian physics, was translated into English two years after its Latin publication, although the second, longer volume offered the "contents" of a Christian physics.
In such a study of the Bible yields philosophical truth rather than mere historical knowledge or contextual background for a religious interpretation. The Christian philosophers asserted the truth of Moses's words in a "strictly natural, literal, and philosophical sense" (as opposed to an allegorical or metaphorical sense), to quote one of the genre's latest exponents. Thus Valles's principle that "God cannot be deceived, nor can he deceive," is echoed by Daneau: "although it is conceded that he spoke simply, Moses should not be accused of having said anything or written on these things mendaciously, falsely, or ignorantly." Some common conclusions drawn from these principles include the existence of supercelestial waters (from Gen. 1:7) or the origins of underground springs from the oceans flowing back to their sources (from Eccles. 1:7). More generally, these philosophers emphasized the directly divine origins of natural phenomena. Aslakss0n, for example, notes that although philosophers attribute the tides to the actions of the planets, it is clear from the Mosaic account that the tides existed before the planets; "therefore Scripture attributes them not only to the planets, but also to the admirable providence of God."41 Piety did not entail abandoning rational thought, however: these "Christian philosophers" mounted incisive attacks on received Aristotelian philosophy, pointing out its contradictions and absurdities, and could be receptive to the latest developments. Most notably, Aslakss0n, who had studied with Tycho Brahe in 1590-1593, favored Copericanism in his De natura coeli triplicis (1597), but he was alone among Comenius's "Christian philosophers" in doing so. In its natural historical formulation, as a "physica specialis" focused on partic- whale and the elephant. From David (i.e., Psalms) we learn brontologia, the physiology of thunder and lightning, which requires the greatest courage, as "Hermes says in the tabula smaragdina." This is the extent of Alsted's allusive treatment. Mosaic physics is presented as separate from and complementary to the much longer (and more Aristotelian-although still eclectic) treatment of physics in an earlier book of the Encyclopedia. Mosaic physics enables Alsted to give special authority to elements of Paracelsian and Hermetic philosophy that appealed to his wide-ranging search for truth but that he never fully managed to reconcile, as he had planned, with more mainstream Aristotelian physics. 43 Even for those most adamant (like Casmann and Comenius) about the need to overthrow the slavish adherence to Aristotle in the name of free and Christian philosophy, the changes involved in practice are not very evident. The early historians of philosophy dismissed Mosaic philosophers precisely on these grounds. Morhof concluded that Daneau, Aslaks-s0n, Alsted, and other authors of Christian physics had followed no certain principles: they either simply commented on Genesis or reduced received Aristotelian physics to the Mosaic principles. J. F. Budde used the example of Casmann to illustrate his broader assessment of those listed by Comenius: in short, they did nothing but confirm scholastic philosophy from the Bible and were more opposed to Aristotle in words than in reality. Indeed, overthrowing Aristotle was easier boasted of than carried out. Furthermore, the Christian philosophers, in attacking a slavish adherence to Aristotle, did not mean to reject received philosophy entirely but to supplement and correct it where necessary according to biblical truth. Thus Daneau cites many philosophical authorities favorably and, for example, defines lightning and thunder in terms of Aristotelian exhalations before giving examples from the Bible showing their deeper, supernatural origins.44 After long, impassioned programmatic chapters, Casmann offers ten short chapters covering the disciplines: grammar, rhetoric, logic, arithmetic, geometry, optics, music, physics, metaphysics, and ethics and politics, following the lead of Alsted's Triumphus bibliorum. But the treatment is tantalizingly brief: in a four-page chapter on "Christian physics," the reader is sent off with the standard definitions and subdivisions (animate and inanimate, rational and irrational, etc.), the standard justifications of the discipline (its piety, utility, and agreeableness), two bibliographical references (Daneau and Lemnius), and references to passages in Job and Genesis. The message is that the reader should "go do it himself" through direct contact with the sacred texts and without much guidance from authorities, true to Protestant tradition. Budde concludes that Casmann should be praised for his call to subdue scholastic philosophy, although he did not carry it out with great success.45
Even Comenius, whom Morhof and Budde consider more consistent and successful than the other "Christian philosophers," reduces his natural philosophy reformed by divine light to a Ramist-style succession of short definitions and explanations, variously supported by biblical references and Paracelsian authors, that also include noticeable, and unacknowledged, similarities with Aristotelian conclusions (that spring waters form from vapors condensed in the caverns of the earth, for example).46 Certainly one can detect in Comenius and parts of Alsted a greater role for Paracelsian principles, which came with explicit Christian credentials and a clear anti-Aristotelian agenda. But none of these authors made a very sustained effort to rebuild on new foundations: "pious philosophy" functioned mostly as an inspiring platform from which to attack enemies among both philosophers and theologians. Furthermore, by its very agenda, pious philosophy perhaps inevitably involved a certain amount of philosophical silence-it was designed precisely to avoid the excessive philosophical niceties characteristic of scholastic Aristotelianism.
Acknowledging the limits of reason and the impossibility of a purely philosophical explanation was itself one of the tactics of pious philosophy. Thus Valles proclaims in one sentence the glory of God and the weakness of the human mind (which requires the guidance of the Church, true to Catholic tradition); Daneau chastises heathen philosophy for its arrogance in failing to recognize the greatness of God.47 One can find elements of a similar strategy in Robert Boyle, who was also concerned that his philosophy serve piety and as a result emphasized the weakness and limits of human reason. Like the Christian philosophers I have considered here, Boyle also offered both a defense of religion against natural philosophers inclined toward excessive naturalism and atheism and a defense of natural philosophy against "timid Christians" who criticized philosophy as a threat to piety. But, in a crucial divergence from Comenius's "most Christian philosophers," Boyle followed Bacon in advocating a separation between philosophy and theology and repeated Bacon's warning against "unwisely mingling and confounding" the two.48 As a result, 45 Christiani."51 Nonetheless, these attempts at literalist reconciliations between the Bible and natural philosophy generally yielded by the late seventeenth century to two dominant alternative strategies, the separationist and the natural theological.
For those who advocated a separation of the natural philosophical and the biblical spheres, the natural philosopher dealt exclusively with philosophy and might be left, in the long run, with little sense of a religious motivation or constraint. Alternatively, for those in the filiation of Boyle and the English natural theologians, natural philosophy was justified as a contribution to the understanding and worship of God. Natural philosophers contributed to a natural religion, which would be supplemented by revelation on issues concerning Christian salvation. These natural theologians were "Christian" in their appellation (and this conception of themselves could have an impact on their scientific practice, as in the case of Boyle, for example) but maintained, by contrast with Comenius's "most Christian philosophers," a boundary between philosophy and theology, which were to be "conjoined" but not "confused." Over the long term this natural theological approach generated a religion that seemed to rely so strongly on the argument from design that when the latter faltered (notably under the impact of Darwin) the whole edifice of religious belief threatened to come down with it.
In this way these two strategies-strict separation (often favored by Catholics) and natural theology (a Protestant specialty)-tended toward the same result: a conception of nature as rationalized and law-bound, evidence of divine creation and general providence, but that left no room for supernatural intervention, biblical authority, or limits on the purview of reason in natural philosophy. Instead, the authors considered here represented one of the last set of attempts at a delicate balancing act to reconcile natural philosophy with a "true piety" beholden to biblical authority. Neither proponents of free philosophy nor obscurantist biblicists, they defended philosophy against those who would eradicate it and they insisted on taking biblical statements about nature seriously. Amid the many innovative natural philosophies competing during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, most of which proclaimed themselves "pious" in some way, these "most pious" philosophers represented an alternative strategy that has been largely forgotten in the depiction of early modem natural philosophy as the conflict between the Aristotelian traditionalists and the modems. To study the nature and potential appeal of their strategy is to understand better the dynamics of contemporary debates and self-presentations, as all early modern philosophers grappled with the ideal of a pious philosophy-an ideal that the Mosaic philosophers pursued more single-mindedly than most. 51 
